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The Military and ''Mob Rule'' 
The CEF Riots in Calgary, February 1916 
P. Whitney Lackenbauer 
D uring the First World War, unruly and ill-disciplined Canadian soldiers, on "assorted 
'patriotic' pretexts," damaged local property and 
battled with local police forces in Victoria, 
Calgary, Winnipeg, Toronto, Campbellton, New 
Brunswick, and other Canadian centres. 1 The 
riots in Calgary in February 1916 involved 
members of Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) 
battalions encamped near the city. While 
historians have focussed on the anti-German 
nature of the attacks, several other 
considerations must be examined to explain the 
unlawful behaviour. Although a court of inquiry 
into the riot failed to conclude who was 
responsible, the contemporary evidence suggests 
strongly that soldiers, rather than civilians, 
started the disturbances. But what conditions 
allowed such behaviour to occur? The military 
context of the time offers insight. Recruitment, 
training and discipline were all factors, as was 
the nearness of the soldiers' camp to Calgary. 
The military, however, denied responsibility, 
arguing that the culprits were "civilians" in 
uniform. By refusing to compensate the owners 
of local establishments for the damages caused 
during the riots, local and national military 
authorities made worse a problem they should 
have prevented. 
When the First World War broke out in August 
1914, Canada was ill-prepared for war. Sam 
Hughes, the Minister of Militia and Defence, 
believed firmly that the virtues of the 'citizen 
soldier' were superior to those of his professional 
counterparts. In Hughes's vision, the permanent 
force existed merely to train the militia; the real 
Canadian fighting spirit was in the broad 
populous who had rallied to the cause in 1812 
and had (in the popular consciousness at least) 
thwarted American Manifest Destiny. Rather than 
abide by pre-war mobilization plans created by 
permanent force officers, Colonel Hughes decided 
to adopt his own. Through a series of night 
telegrams, Hughes invited newly-formed, 
numbered battalions to an uncompleted military 
camp at Valcartier, near Quebec City. 2 
Of the first contingent of soldiers at Valcartier, 
one third hailed from west of Ontario, a 
proportion that far exceeded the west's 
population. Sam Hughes first pushed aside 
suggestions that centrally located depots were 
needed to gather and train unbrigaded recruits. 
But as the war progressed, officials decided that 
the majority of units raised in Western Canada 
would receive preliminary training in their 
military district of origin and then proceed 
directly to England. 3 
In Alberta, there was a dire need for a 
mobilization camp. As the headquarters of 
Military District No.13, Calgary was a natural 
focal point for such a concentration, and by 1915, 
new recruits began to gather in the city. 
Unfortunately, as Ottawa authorized Alberta's 
militia units to recruit to war strength, Calgary 
had no barracks, and virtually no uniforms or 
equipment. The shortages became even more 
acute when, in late 1915, Sam Hughes authorized 
the 56th, 82nd and 89th Infantry Battalions to 
recruit from the Calgary area. 4 A large military 
camp teeming with young men pleased local 
business owners, especially hotel owners 
(prohibition was not introduced until1918), and 
the city prospered early in the war. 
Brigadier-General Ernest A. Cruikshank was 
the commander of the Alberta district. 
Cruikshank had joined the militia as an ensign 
in 1877, rising in rank to become a lieutenant-
colonel in the militia. In 1909, he transferred to 
the permanent force and was appointed to 
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bars. Many recruits were 
getting restless and anxious 
to get overseas!"10 
This volatile mix was 
further stirred up by other 
influences circulating within 
the community. As the dream 
of a short war died, so did 
tolerance for ethnic groups 
associated with the enemy. 
Across the country, as 
macabre tales of German 
atrocities began to circulate, 
anti-German hysteria swept 
through Anglo-Canadian 
society. The rhetoric helped 
transform the war: instead of 
participating out of 
obligation to Britain, 
«: Canadians began to view the 
:;;; war as a defence of 
-~ civilization itself.'' In mid-
~ January 1916, Senator 
~James A. Lougheed of 
,.8 Calgary fed the paranoia, 
.3] arguing before the Senate 
0 that Germany's designs for 
command the district. He 
soon developed a reputation 
as an able administrator, one 
"with scrupulous regard for 
the public purse" who strove 
for "economy and efficiency 
when extravagance and 
waste were palliated in other 
districts."5 When Sir John 
French, the Inspector 
General of the Imperial 
Service, inspected the 
Calgary camp in 1911 he 
deemed Cruikshank a "most 
conscientious, zealous, 
reliable and intelligent 
officer, with strong common 
sense. "6 The Chief of the 
Canadian General Staff, 
Major-General Colin 
Mackenzie, was even more 
laudatory the following year. 
He concluded: "[Cruikshank] 
has an intimate knowledge of 
the character and military 
aptitude of officers serving in 
his Command. He might be 
relied on to do well on 
service. •>? Cruikshank also 
had a reputation of being 
strict when dealing with his 
officers, a trait he had 
displayed during his militia 
days and carried with him to 
Brigadier-General Ernest A. Cruikshank, 
commander oj the Alberta militia district, 
was the officer in command during the 
1916 riots. 
"world power" and 
"territorial conquest" 
extended to the Western 
hemisphere and Canada 
itself. "Germany, through its 
the regular force. Rather than distancing him 
from his officers it appeared to earn him the 
respect, even affection, of his subordinates.8 
By the cold winter of 1916, soldiers on the 
streets of Calgary were commonplace. Over the 
winter, the trainees were billeted in barracks at 
the old Victoria Park or in the newly-converted 
Price Jones and Calgary Furniture Company 
buildings in Calgary. The temperatures forced 
most of the training indoors; only platoon and 
parade drill and the occasional route marches 
broke the monotony. 9 So did the search for new 
recruits. Soldier Harvey Daniel Duncan described 
the situation in Calgary in early 1916: "On Eighth 
Avenue and over the country, recruiting offices 
were operating at full strength. White feathers 
were being handed out to eligible bachelors! 
Young recruits swaggered around the streets and 
32 
system of espionage, has a 
more thorough knowledge of Canada in the 
pigeon-holes of its foreign office than would be 
found in the departments of our own 
Government," Lougheed proclaimed, and "the 
greatest menace to Canada from this war lies in 
this situation."12 Conspiracy-minded Canadians 
blamed the burning of the Parliament Buildings 
in February 1916 on Germans, compounding 
existing tensions. In Calgary, home to the largest 
German population of any city or town in Alberta 
(2,608 in 1911), came strong demands to 
terminate the employment of Germans, revoke 
the voting rights of "enemy aliens" and intern 
Germans and Austrians. 13 
Within this context, soldiers stationed at 
barracks in Calgary decided to take matters in 
their own hands. Rumours were circulating that 
the White Lunch Company had fired returned 
soldiers and employed enemy aliens in their 
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In this staged photograph, Calgary firemen attack effigies oj German soldiers. 
places. A handwritten sign reiterating this belief 
was posted in the camp canteen for all to read: 
"Keep away from the 'White Lunch.' They fired 
two British waiters and engaged one German and 
one Austrian in their places .. 14 On the afternoon 
of 10 February 1916, F.H. Naegel, the manager 
of the White Lunch on 8th Avenue, called the 
General Officer Commanding (GOC) and wamed 
him of rumours that there might be trouble. 
Brigadier Cruikshank did not act on the 
warnings, later claiming that he could not do 
anything unless Naegel put a request in writing 
(which the latter did not do). Unfortunately, as 
events unfolded, the White Lunch manager's 
foreboding proved to be well founded. 
At about 8:00pm, four soldiers walked into 
the White Lunch Restaurant at 128 8th Avenue 
East. They stood around the checkout counter, 
where a woman at the counter overheard their 
conversation; when they departed she informed 
the manager that there was going to be trouble. 
A group of soldiers soon headed steadily 
eastward on the south side of 8th Ave. towards 
the restaurant. By the time it reached the 
restaurant, the crowd numbered several hundred 
soldiers. In front of the establishment, a soldier 
gave the order for the men to halt, and they tumed 
in formation to face the White Lunch. They then 
rushed across the street. The Calgary Chief of 
Police first heard of the raid at 8:15 pm. He 
gathered up about 15 men to try and counter 
what appeared to be ominous developments. 15 
An Ottawa newspaper painted a vivid picture of 
what transpired: 
Chief of Police Cuddy, half a dozen constables 
and plainclothesmen hurried to the place. All 
customers were sent out and the doors locked. 
When the soldiers arrived the chief asked them 
to disperse and not to behave in an unlawful 
manner. He was disregarded, and as a 
preliminary a shower of missiles went crashing 
through the big plate glass windows [and made 
an entrance through this route]. A woman 
cashier, trying to save some plants, was slightly 
hurt, and Police Constable Fraser so badly cut 
by flying glass that he had to go to the hospital. 
The policemen were swept aside like chips in a 
gale and for an hour the mob did its will with 
the place. The crowd was increased to two 
thousand and the officers were helpless. The 
furniture fixtures and cooking apparatus were 
smashed to fragments. Marble counters and 
stands looked as though artillery shells had 
exploded. A cash register was ripped open and 
looted. Coffee urns and gas stoves were tom from 
their places. Electric fixtures were pulled down. 
The street outside was littered with wreckage. 
The safe was thrown downstairs into the 
basement, breaking the stairs. 16 
While the soldiers attacked the restaurant, a 
crowd of several thousand looked on. What 
33 
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}lenbow Archives NA-1469-51 Pre-riot photos of the White Lunch Restaurant. Glenbow Archives NA -1469-4~ 
fragments of furniture remained were thrown 
onto the street and reduced to even smaller pieces 
by the crowd. 
Once finished with the restaurant, the rioters 
smashed down the door leading upstairs to the 
dance academy on the second floor. The 
proprietor of the academy was teaching a number 
of soldiers how to dance at the time the crowd 
arrived at the building, and had even hung a Red 
Ensign outside of his window prior to the raid 
"to show the boys that they were British in the 
Dance Hall." Nevertheless, the frenzied mob went 
to work. The windows were "burst out," the 
furniture (including the piano) was broken and 
hurled onto the street, and the flags and 
decorations on the walls were reduced to ribbons. 
In a feat of particular daring, the flag outside the 
dance academy was pulled down, and the electric 
sign that projected the restaurant's name over 
the sidewalk crashed to the ground. 17 
The authorities seemed powerless to 
intervene. During the riot, Mr. Naegel from the 
White Lunch fled to the central fire station but 
was rebuffed by the fire department when he 
sought their assistance. As it turned out, the 
dense crowd kept the fire-fighting equipment 
from getting to the restaurant. Like the police, 
the firemen could only join the spectators. 18 Police 
chief Cuddy took did not order his men to use 
force against the mob as he "recognized at once 
that such action would only tend to antagonize 
the soldiers, and might possibly have resulted 
in murder." Although a few drunken soldiers tried 
to assault the police, chief Cuddy doubted that 
"a military guard, much less a handful of 
policemen, would have saved the object of their 
Post-riot photo of the White Lunch Restaurant. 
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attack." 19 With no police 
resolve to risk active 
intervention, the 8th 
Avenue site was utterly 
destroyed. 
Concurrent to the 
attack on the 8th Avenue 
building, a "second 
division" of soldiers had 
converged on the other 
White Lunch location at 
r .. 
j 
to the story, treating readers 
to photos of the damage done 
to each of the restaurants, but 
also headlining with the 
reassurance that the police 
had names of the "riot 
ringleaders." The newspaper 
expressed little sympathy for 
\9 the rioters, stressed that the 
~ attack should never have 
~ occurred, and called for both i military and civilian inquiries ~ 528 19th Avenue, some six :o into the "disgraceful 
:2 blocks southwest of the 2 proceedings." An editorial 
first riot. Urged on by ~ dismissed the alleged causes 
civilians and with no police .8 for the attack as "insufficient 
to oppose them, the mob .§ to have warranted such 
destroyed the restaurant in ° lawless" behaviour, and ruled 
one rush. The waiters and that "such conduct as the men 
cashiers fled immediately, of the Calgary garrison 
and the soldiers went to indulged in last evening might 
work in earnest. Daring suit Hun tastes, but it is 
exploits were later entirely foreign to the British 
recounted with pride: Alfred Cuddy principle." It suggested that 
soldiers had hung from the Calgary Chief of Police other Calgary institutions 
chandeliers, pleasing the destructive crowd with were threatened, but emphasized that Calgarians 
acrobatic stunts. The Calgary Albertan noted that could not afford to tolerate mob law under any 
within a few minutes, the place "looked as though circumstances. 22 
it were situated 'somewhere in Ypres,' and that a 
howitzer shell had exploded."20 
With police unable to restore order, the 
military scrambled to control the situation. 
Brigadier Cruikshank heard of the riots just after 
9:00pm. The Chief Constable told him that he 
could not control the crowd, so Cruikshank 
proceeded to 8th Avenue to address the excited 
throng. The commanding officer ordered the 
soldiers to return to their quarters and they 
quickly complied. Unarmed picquets were 
established and there were no further signs of 
disorder. 21 By midnight all was quiet again, but 
the gaping fronts of the wrecked buildings and 
the littered debris of smashed furniture and 
fittings on the street bore witness to the night's 
destruction. 
The local and national press immediately 
responded to these sensational events. The next 
day, the Morning Albertan highlighted the 
soldiers' disobedience to the will of police and 
superior officers, and the inability of the 
authorities to cope with the excited crowd. The 
Calgary Herald devoted most of its front page 
On ll February, Brigadier Cruikshank 
addressed all of the units under his command 
at their various quarters, condemning the 
conduct of the perpetrators the night before and 
pointing to the penalties such outrages 
warranted. He also held a meeting of the various 
units' commanding officers, the Mayor, the City 
Solicitor and the Chief Constable of Calgary. The 
officers issued a unanimous opinion that there 
was no danger of further disorder, which seemed 
to satisfy the civic officials. As a precautionary 
measure, the commanding officers were ordered 
to double the strength of their picquets. In 
addition, several local businesses informed the 
GOC that they had received threats to their 
buildings if they did not discharge all enemy alien 
employees. Cruikshank made sure each of the 
unit commanders were aware of these potential 
flash points. 23 
The officers wildly missed the mark with their 
optimistic estimate that no more riots were 
forthcoming. The following evening, "trouble 
came like a bomb from the blue heavens, sudden, 
demoralizing, appalling. "24 Between 8 and 9 pm, 
35 
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The bar area oj the Riverside Hotel following its destruction by the mob. 
a group of 500 soldiers and civilians proceeded 
across the Langevin Bridge to the Riverside Hotel 
in the predominantly German-speaking 
Riverside-Bridgeland area of the city. This time, 
rumour had it that the English owner of the 
Riverside Hotel was actually a German and had 
hosted a meeting of pro-German sympathizers 
to celebrate the burning of the Canadian 
Parliament in Ottawa. Whatever justification the 
crowd conjured up, hundreds of soldiers 
gathered in front of the Alberta Hotel and shouted 
and yelled to the interest of pedestrians as they 
marched eastward along 8th Avenue. The mob 
absorbed soldiers and civilians as it moved along, 
numbering at least a thousand by the time it 
reached the corner of 4th Street East. Brigadier 
Cruikshank had hastily arranged picquets and 
the commanding officers of the local battalions 
marched to the scene of the rioting as soon as 
word of the mob was received. Each officer tried 
to form a guard with men picked from the crowd, 
but it was too late. The mob, estimated later at 
over 1500, overwhelmed the meagre defences, 
moved into the building, and "for two hours a 
veritable reign of terror prevailed. "25 The soldiers' 
appetite for excitement, still whetted by the 
adrenaline rush from the night before, was not 
yet satisfied. The rioters first destroyed the bar, 
and with their spirits lifted by stolen alcohol they 
began to destroy the entire property. Alfred Henry 
Ebsworth, the owner of the Riverside, took stock 
of the damage afterwards: 
36 
... every room in the house had been visited 
and ... the interior of the hotel was a complete 
wreck. The bar fixtures, counters, electric light 
fixtures and all other property was either 
smashed up and destroyed or removed ... 
considerable damage was done to the building 
itself, the stairway was pulled down and 
demolished completely, the radiators in the 
rooms were twisted and torn from their 
bearings, the keystone over the arch of the main 
entrance was knocked out, permitting the 
building to settle and disclosing large cracks in 
the brickwork ... .Iron beds are broken, twisted 
and warped so that many of them would be 
absolutely beyond repairs, the mirrors, dressing 
cases, chairs and bureaus are all broken, many 
of them in cases pitched through the windows, 
the curtains are tom down and the carpets and 
rugs damaged completely through liquor, water 
and other refuse brought upon the premises.~6 
Little was left of the 48-room hotel when the mob 
had finished. Satisfied that its work was done at 
the hotel, the mob went back over the turn and 
moved uptown. 27 
Subsequent activity suggested that strong 
picquets were, in fact, reliable means of 
dissuading soldiers from riotous acts. Rumours 
abounded that Kolb's restaurant and Cronn's 
Rathskeller were targeted for the next attacks, 
but the mob (its ranks now swelled by civilian 
men and women "out for the sake of the 
sensation") was forestalled by "khaki-clad lines" 
barring their way. Some 700 soldiers on piquet 
duty simply lined up in front of these buildings 
6
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and there was no attempt to "rush" them. The 
Palliser Hotel, a brewery, and the office of the 
Canadian Bible Society (that had circulated 
German bibles) were also threatened but military 
guards discouraged any action. By midnight the 
cold, tired crowds, bored by the lack of action, 
dispersed. According to the owner of the 
Riverside Hotel. this "clearly demonstrat[ed] that 
a firm stand was all that was necessary to put a 
stop to the rioting at any stage."28 
The riots continued to generate attention in 
weeks ahead. The military authorities were, of 
course, preoccupied with maintaining order. 
Brigadier Cruikshank sent off a hasty telegram 
to the Militia Council in Ottawa stating that the 
restaurants and hotel had been "wrecked by [a] 
band of soldiers and others" and that every effort 
was being made to keep order in the face of 
widespread "anti-German excitement." To 
prevent a reoccurrence, Cruikshank placed all 
of the hotel bars out of bounds, any soldier on 
the street without a pass was liable for arrest. 
and troops were held in readiness "to repress 
disorder." Each battalion was allotted a segment 
of the city and a roll call was held every hour to 
ensure that the soldiers were present and 
accounted for. 29 According to a local informant, 
other businesses continued to be "seriously 
menaced but no damage [was] done" on account 
of "strong armed pickets [sic]" that were 
established around the city. 30 Terrified local 
German-speaking residents, most of whom 
originated from Russia and were not German 
nationals, barricaded themselves into their 
homes. 
The streets were quiet, but the rhetoric and 
pressure for government action continued to 
mount. While condemning the rioters for creating 
an incident that could be used to justify "gross 
cruelty to Canadian prisoners," the Albertan 
lobbied for the internment of all enemy aliens, 
"not merely because of the violent outbursts of 
some Calgary soldiers" but because it was the 
most "human and charitable" thing to doY 
City Council was caught in the hail of 
controversy over the riots and the apparent threat 
to social stability in Calgary. On the morning of 
Saturday, 12 February, Council held a special 
meeting attended by Brigadier Cruikshank. He 
assured the City that he would maintain control 
of the military in the City without imposing 
martial law. Council passed a resolution 
expressing their confidence in the military 
authorities. Furthermore, Council authorized the 
Mayor "to do all acts necessary to effectively co-
operate with the Military authorities to maintain 
order." If further trouble arose, and civilians 
interfered, Cruikshank said he would call on the 
magistrate to ask them to disperse. The mayor, 
for his part, appealed to Calgarians to stay off 
the street and asked Alberta's premier, A.L. 
Sifton, to close all the bars and liquor stores until 
further notice. 
To quell the anti-German hysteria, Council 
immediately dismissed all civic employees of 
alien nationality and laid off all street railway 
company employees born in enemy countries. 
Finally, to curtail more lawless behaviour by 
soldiers, a rider was added to the motion stating 
that returned soldiers be employed where 
possible in the places of the discharged. Calgary's 
mayor also urged the federal government to 
intern all enemy aliens in Canada, whether 
naturalized or not. 32 These resolutions, coupled 
with media and public sentiment that condemned 
the unruly and destructive behaviour but upheld 
the explicit motivations of the rioters, meant that 
the soldiers had indeed achieved some of their 
substantial objectives. 
Military authorities in Ottawa were troubled 
by the disruptions caused by soldiers acting 
without consent and against the orders of their 
officers. The Governor-General, His Royal 
Highness the Duke of Connaught, was appalled 
by the "disgraceful behaviour of the troops at 
Calgary" as it showed "great lack of tact on the 
part of the officers and want of discipline on the 
part of the men." He wanted to know what the 
local military authorities were doing about it. 33 
In the House of Commons on 14 February, 
opposition leader Sir Wilfrid Laurier questioned 
the prime minister about the Calgary 
disturbances and asked what steps the 
Government had done to control enlisted men 
"in places where liquor runs freely." Sir Robert 
Borden denied any indication that liquor was 
involved, but a telegram from Brigadier 
Cruikshank confirmed Laurier's information the 
following day: 
Attacks on restaurants and hotel undoubtedly 
led by some soldiers mainly under influence of 
liquor. Civilians participated in second attack 
apparently inflamed by reports of meetings of 
37 
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enemy aliens and that employees had been 
discharged to give place for aliens. These attacks 
now being investigated by court of enquiry. 
Several arrests have been made and these men 
handed over to civilian authorities."• 
The prime minister reported back to Parliament 
that an inquiry was being made and that an 
official report would be received in due course. 
He was, nevertheless, "sure that the reports" 
received on the Calgary incidents had "been very 
greatly exaggerated. "35 
Only after the Riverside Hotel riot did 
Cruikshank finally put tangible measures in place 
to prevent another recurrence. Returning from 
City Hall on 12 February, Cruikshank informed 
the commanding officers that they would be 
responsible for "good order and discipline" within 
their units and around the city. For the next four 
days these instructions remained in force, and 
the local battalions were sent on long marches 
in the country to walk off ""a whole lot of 
effervescent animal spirits. ":16 
The GOC established a court of inquiry to 
investigate the attacks on the White Lunch 
restaurants on ll February, the day after the 
initial riot. The court was assembled at district 
headquarters, along with concurrent but separate 
proceedings to inquire into the attack on the 
Riverside Hotel. The court met daily until 24 
February. Seventy-three witnesses, including the 
Calgary Chief of Police, police detectives, several 
military officers and non-commissioned officers 
(NCOs), Mr. Naegel (proprietor of the White 
Lunch on 8th Avenue) and soldiers allegedly 
involved in the attack testified before the panel 
regarding the attacks on the restaurants. Another 
43 witnesses appeared to offer testimony on the 
Riverside riot. 37 
The enlisted ranks and NCOs who gave 
testimony before the courts made it difficult to 
attribute specific blame for the riots. Members 
of the local battalions were generally unwilling 
to implicate their comrades,38 and most of the 
soldiers in the raids had ripped off their 
regimental shoulder badges. 39 Rumours about 
the White Lunch and Riverside had apparently 
circulated before the nights' events, but the vast 
majority testified that the raids were spontaneous 
acts with no particular leaders. 40 Most pleaded 
that they only learned of the attacks once they 
had started. They testified that they were simply 
38 
told to "fall in" as trained and they did, often 
unaware of where they were heading- and that 
they were at the scenes only due to idle curiosity. 
When their memories failed them as to their 
whereabouts or alleged activities, several turned 
to drunkenness as an excuse.41 
Both military and civilian officials were more 
pointed in their testimony, but they also tended 
to blame each other. Military officers who testified 
were not reluctant to name and incriminate 
soldiers they saw at the riots, but they also tended 
to stress the role of civilians in the raids. Civil 
authorities, however, blamed the soldiers almost 
universally. Numerous "ordinary soldiers" 
insisted that the attacks were actually started by 
civilians "of a lawless sort" who were then joined 
by some men in uniform.42 
In the end, the court of inquiry yielded 
inconclusive evidence. In the post-inquiry report 
to the Militia Council on the Calgary 
disturbances, Cruikshank reflected that: 
Every possible effort has been made by these 
Courts to procure evidence against all persons 
implicated in these disturbances. Their 
exertions in this respect have not been attended 
with as much success as was desired. All 
soldiers against whom there was any evidence 
of having participated in these attacks were then 
taken into custody and handed over to the Civil 
authorities for trial. 
Thirteen soldiers were tried in civilian court and 
five convicted, with minimum charges and 
sentences laid. Another two were discharged from 
the military. 43 As for the cause of the riotous 
behaviour, Cruikshank did not believe that the 
military was responsible. The GOC was "very 
strongly of the opinion that these disturbances 
were largely due to inflammatory letters and 
articles which appeared in certain newspapers, 
and the injudicious remarks made by civilians. "44 
As a result, the Adjutant-General did not feel that 
any further action was necessary on the part of 
the military authorities. 
The Chief of Police was critical of the local 
military officials who, he felt, were guilty of 
inaction and were responsible for the damage to 
the Riverside Hotel, if not the White Lunch 
restaurants.45 Commissioned officers belonging 
to the same battalions as the men destroying the 
local properties made no effort to stop them. 
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Soldiers from the 50th Battalion marching through the streets of Calgary. 
Furthermore, it was "common talk amongst the 
citizens and the soldiers who took part in the 
rioting or were then in camp" that Cruikshank 
bore at least partial responsibility. Had the 
General taken ordinary preventative measures 
and "asserted his authority in a more vigorous 
manner," the attack on the Riverside would never 
have taken place. Chief Cuddy's sympathy was 
with the owner of the hotel, not the military 
authorities who had tried to maintain order. 
"Through no fault of his own and as a result of 
the failure of the military authorities to control 
the situation," the Chief reasoned, "Mr. Ebsworth 
[the owner of the Riverside Hotel] lost everything 
he owned." Since it was impossible to get any 
compensation from the men convicted by the 
Police Court, Cuddy pleaded that "purely as a 
matter of equity, it would seem only fair and 
reasonable that the [Federal] Government should 
make some compensation" to the owner who had 
lost "the entire fruits of almost twenty years effort 
in this country" due to matters completely beyond 
his control. 46 
What was "fair and reasonable" to the City 
was not palatable to the military. In the aftermath 
of the riots, various Calgary lawyers wrote to the 
Minister of the Militia and Defence to seek 
damages for the White Lunch Cafe and Riverside 
Hotel. Mr. Ebsworth claimed losses and damages 
totalling nearly $9,000.00 as a result of the raid, 
and the lessee of the hotel claimed another 
$6635.00 in damagesY The Judge Advocate 
General, however, decided in April 1916 that 
given the results of the inquiry "into the alleged 
riot" the Department was not liable for damages. 
"The Government is in no way responsible for 
the wrong-doing of its soldiers" he concluded. 48 
When a law firm acting on behalf of White Lunch 
Limited requested compensation, a more 
substantive defence was issued: 
The evidence shows that the destruction 
complained of was done by a mob composed 
for the greater part of men in military uniform, 
with some civilians. The men in uniform, 
however, were not there as soldiers, were not 
under orders or on duty as a military body, were 
not acting as servants or agents of the Crown, 
but proceeded merely as individual citizens 
subject to the Criminal Law of the land, and 
amenable to civil tribunals .... It must then be 
plain to you, as it is to the Officials of this 
Department, that much as the outrage in 
question is to be deplored, much as your clients 
are entitled to sympathy, and much as the rioters 
are deserving of the severest punishment, yet 
the public as represented by the Government at 
Ottawa are not answerable for the depredations 
in question. 49 
The owners of the three establishments destroyed 
during the riots of February 1916 continued to 
press for compensation, but the defence 
department stuck to this position. The Crown 
had legal immunity, but its moral position was 
less certain. An American lawyer writing on behalf 
of the owners of the White Lunch made the case 
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that his claimants were obviously "innocent 
victims of popular excitement brought about by 
the great war and working through a force of 
soldiery only partially disciplined which got out 
of hand and with which the local police proved 
entirely unable to cope." In the United States, 
even in cases where blame was much less 
transparent that this, the government had 
"repeatedly made compensation as a matter of 
grace irrespective of the question of legal 
liability. "50 
The military never paid compensation for 
damages, although its justification is 
questionable in light of other cases. In October 
1916, a few hundred civilians and soldiers 
attacked the Royal Northwest Mounted Police 
(RNWMP) Barracks in Calgary to demand the 
release of five soldiers who had been arrested 
for violating the liquor act. A subsequent court 
of enquiry heard evidence similar to that offered 
during the February hearings. Several individual 
soldiers were charged, fined and discharged, and 
the Department of Militia and Defence paid for 
the damage done to the RNWMP barracks and 
for personal items that were damaged or stolen.51 
The Judge Advocate General never saw fit to 
comment on why this compensation should be 
paid, perhaps because the amount was 
significantly less than that demanded by the 
owners of the White Lunch and Riverside. 
Furthermore, compassionate grants were made 
in England following the riots of Canadian troops 
at Witley Camp in 1919 that seemed to resemble 
the Calgary claims. 52 However, the Department 
recognized that the compensation question 
extended beyond the Calgary incident. If 
compensation was paid to Mr. Ebsworth, the JAG 
argued, "it would open up a similar question in 
the numerous other cases where, riots having 
occurred, compensation from the Crown was 
requested and payment of the same has been 
refused. I refer particularly to the riots in Quebec 
in 1918. "53 Mr. Ebsworth, who was ruined by the 
attack, continued to seek restitution well into the 
Second World War, but his effort was ultimately 
in vain. 
The drudgery of life for the citizen-soldiers 
stationed in Calgary, and the swirling tempest of 
anti-alien prejudice in early 1916, set the context 
for the riots. The attacks were prompted by 
nativist ideas, but they were also products of poor 
40 
military discipline and misadministration on a 
local level. That very few soldiers were punished 
for the riots (a mere seven out of the more than 
1,000 estimated to be involved) made the episode 
all the more disconcerting. Later courts of inquiry 
were rich in descriptions of what occurred, but 
barren in evidence that identified the mob 
leaders. The men who composed the mob may 
have been in khaki uniforms, but when engaged 
in rioting, the military refused to consider them 
soldiers. 
By blaming civil society and anti-German 
rhetoric for the riotous behaviour, and refusing 
to take meaningful responsibility for what had 
transpired, military officials ignored their role 
and responsibility for the damage. Although 
recruited to serve the causes of peace and justice, 
over-zealous and misguided Canadian soldiers 
threatened the security of a community in the 
very country they had pledged their lives to 
defend. The real victims were not members of 
Calgary society threatened by the continued 
presence of "enemy aliens," but individual 
citizens, the owners of the White Lunch Company, 
the Dance Academy, and the Riverside Hotel. 
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